This paper develops a simple calculus for order of magnitude reasoning. A seman tics is given with soundness and complete ness results. Order of magnitude probabil ity functions are easily defined and turn out to be equivalent to kappa functions, which are slight generalisations of Spohn's Natu ral Conditional Functions. The calculus also gives rise to an order of magnitude deci sion theory, which can be used to justify an amended version of Pearl's decision theory for kappa functions, although the latter is weaker and less expressive. Order of magnitude reasoning is a common and impor tant form of reasoning. This paper develops a simple formal calculus for such reasoning, giving a semantics for it, in terms of a new theory of infinitesimals, with soundness and completeness results. This is applied to develop order of magnitude probabilistic reasoning, in particular, an order of magnitude decision theory (partly inspired by that given in (Pearl, 93]). Such a theory might be used in an application where the infor mation is of poor quality, so an expert may be happier just giving these very rough indications of probabilities and utilities. Section 4 introduces the order of magnitude calculus JR0• For each integer n we have an element ( +, n ) meaning 'of order �n ', and an element (-, n ) mean ing 'of order -�n '. If we add something of order �n to something of order -�n then the result can be of order ±�m for any m 2:: n: to ensure closure of the calculus under addition we therefore add element (0, n ) repre senting this set of possibilities. The operations on JR• induce operations on JR0; we explore the properties of this algebraic structure, and show how calculations can be performed within JR0• Section 5 gives the semantics in terms of sets of extended reals, with soundness and completeness results for the calculus.
Introduction
Order of magnitude reasoning is a common and impor tant form of reasoning. This paper develops a simple formal calculus for such reasoning, giving a semantics for it, in terms of a new theory of infinitesimals, with soundness and completeness results. This is applied to develop order of magnitude probabilistic reasoning, in particular, an order of magnitude decision theory (partly inspired by that given in (Pearl, 93] ). Such a theory might be used in an application where the infor mation is of poor quality, so an expert may be happier just giving these very rough indications of probabilities and utilities.
Section 2 describes the mathematical construction (from (W ilson, 95] ) of a new non-standard probabil ity theory, building on ideas of Pearl (93b] and Gold szmidt (92] . Extended reals JR• are defined to be ra tional functions in parameter �, which is considered to be a very small unknown positive real number. Ex tended Probability and utility functions are defined in the usual way, except that they now can take values in JEt. A serious problem with theories of infinitesimal probability is that it can be hard to say what these new values mean. However, section 3 (based on section 3 of (W ilson, 95]) shows how this theory overcomes the problem, giving a meaning to infinitesimal values of probability.
Section 4 introduces the order of magnitude calculus JR0• For each integer n we have an element ( +, n ) meaning 'of order �n ', and an element (-, n ) mean ing 'of order -�n '. If we add something of order �n to something of order -�n then the result can be of order ±�m for any m 2:: n: to ensure closure of the calculus under addition we therefore add element (0, n ) repre senting this set of possibilities. The operations on JR• induce operations on JR0; we explore the properties of this algebraic structure, and show how calculations can be performed within JR0• Section 5 gives the semantics in terms of sets of extended reals, with soundness and completeness results for the calculus.
In section 6, order of magnitude probabilities and util ities are defined; the probability functions are equiva lent to kappa functions, which are a slight generalisa tion of Spohn's Natural Conditional Functions (NCFs) (Spohn, 90) , so the results of sections 3 and 5 can be used to give a formal semantics for kappa functions. An order of magnitude decision theory is constructed in section 7, and a completeness result given. The decision theory for kappa functions in (Pearl, 93a] is discussed, and partially justified by the results of this paper.
Extended Reals and Probability
This section constructs Extended Probability by first extending JR by adding an infinitesimal element �, to form a new number system JR• and then defining prob ability in the usual way.
2.1
The Extended Reals R• Let the Extended Reals JR• be JR(�), the field of ra tional functions in (dummy variable) � over the field JR (Maclane and Birkhoff, 79, page 122] . Each element of JR: can be written as a pair plq where p and q are polynomial functions in �, and plq represents the same element of JR: as r Is if and only if ps is the same polynomial as qr. IFf' clearly contains a copy of JR: for x E JR, the ratio of constant polynomials xl1 is in m•' and we'll denote this element of m• also by X. In particular the element 0 of m· is the function which has constant value 0.
Every non-zero element r of m• can be uniquely ex pressed as r� 1 r', where r E lR \ {0}, r is in Z, the set of integers, and r1 E m• is such that r'(O) = 1. Define 6 = oo. The function r f-+ r gives the order of magnitude (in terms of powers of �) of element r of m·.
2.2
The Ordering on R:
If r = pI q E m• where p' q are polynomials in �' then' for x E JR, r(x) (the value of r when xi s substituted for �) is a real number, if q(x) f. 0. � is intended to be a very small positive number, so we define r > s iff r is bigger than B for small enough �: for r, B E m•' define relation > by r > s if and only there exists strictly positive real number y such that r(x) > s(x) for all real x with 0 < x < y. Relations <, � and :::; are defined from relation > in the usual way, e. g. , r :::; s if and only if s > r or s = r.
We have r > s if and only if r-s > 0, and (i) r, s > 0 implies r + s > 0 and rs > 0, and (ii) for each r E m•, exactly one of the following hold: (a) r > 0, (b) r = 0, (c) -r > 0. Therefore m• is an ordered field [Maclane and Birkhoff, 79, p261] . However, it lacks the completeness property, that every subset of positive elements has a greatest lower bound (consider, for example, the (copy of t he) positive real numbers in m•). Thus m• is not a non-standard model of the reals in the sense of Robinson's theory of hyperreals [Stroyan and Luxemburg, 76] . It is however isomorphic to a subset of the hyperreals, using the monomorphism m generated by m(x) = x for x E lR and m(�) = �� where �� is any positive infinitesimal.
Though they are defined as functions, elements of m• should be thought of as numbers; � is a positive num ber smaller than any strictly positive real number, e2 is an even smaller positive number, e-e2 is between two, though much closer toe, and so on.
2.3
Extended Probability Theory
To define Extended Probability and Utility, the usual definitions suffice, except using m• instead of JR. Let !.1 be a finite set, which is intended to represent a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events. An Ex tended Utility function on !.1 is a function from !.1 to m•.
Let R be a set containing distinguished elements 0 and 1 with binary operation + and relation :::; on it, and binary operation I defined on all pairs r E R, s E R' where R' � R. Define an R-valued probability func tion P over !.1 to be a function from 2° to R satisfying
(iii) if A� B then P(A):::; P(B).
For R-valued probability function P over !.1 and A, B � !.1 with P(B) E R', the conditional probability P(AJB) is defined to be the value P(A n B)IP(B).
JR-valued probability functions are just the usual prob ability functions (with R' = lR \ {0}). Define Ex tended Probability functions to be m• -valued proba bility functions (with R' = m• \ {0}). It can easily be checked that extended probability functions take values in (0, 1r = {r E m• : 0:::; r:::; 1}.
3

Interpretation of Extended Probability
It is very important to be able to ascribe meaning to values of probability and utility. Clearly if an agent is going to sensibly make probability statements such as Pr( A) = r, it is necessary that she understands what this means. Also, Extended Probability theory will be used to give a semantics to order of magni tude probability theory and Spohn's NCFs; the value of this semantics is heavily dependent on how strong a semantics can be given to Extended Probability the ory. The issues are discussed in [W ilson, 95] , and are reviewed here.
To justify the ordering used on the extended reals is fairly straight-forward. The value e is considered to be an unknown small positive real number; the ordering given is the only sensible one given that we want m• to be an ordered field; [W ilson, 95, 3 .1] justifies the ordering axiomatically.
The axioms of Extended Probability can be justified by adapting the Dutch book argument [de Finetti, 74 ] or Cox's axioms [Cox, 46] ; alternatively, we can view an Extended Probability function P as a family of prob ability functions {Pr,} indexed by parameter e rang ing over a positive neighbourhood (in JR) of 0 (this is closely related to Convergent PPDs in [Goldszmidt, 92] ), and use standard justifications of (real-valued) Bayesian probability (see [Wilson, 95, 3.2] ).
Interpretation of Probability and Utility Values
We will indicate how an agent could (in theory at least) use a sequence of thought experiments to give meaning to an assignment 'Pr(A) = r' for arbitrary events A and for Extended Reals r between 0 and 1. We will assume that an agent knows what Pr( A) = x means for real value :r: E [ 0, 1], using a standard justification of Bayesian probability, either by comparison with a chance experiment (e.g. [Shafer, 81] ) or a Dutch book argument (e.g., [de Finetti, 74 ] ).1
The agent first imagines some (possible) event E of unknown small probability, and calls this value �. This step is arbitrary to quite a large extent; however once this has been chosen, the agent must stick with it for the problem at hand.
Suppose ( derstand the meaning of a probability of r s, the agent imagines two independent events A and B with prob abilities r and s respectively; A n B has probability rs.
If she imagines events C and D with C � D and prob abilities r and s respectively then the value s -r is the probability of event D \ C and the value r / s is the probability of event C, conditional on D being true.
For r, s with r + s :::=; 1, the agent should imagine mu tually exclusive F and G with probabilities r and s respectively; then an event should be assigned a prob ability value of r + s if and only if it is considered equiprobable to F U G.
It turns out that any r E [ 0, 1 r can be reached using these rules, so by making a sequence of such thought experiments, using qualitative judgements, an agent can calibrate any of the possible values of Extended Probability.
Meaning must be given to Extended Real values of utility. We start off by assuming that an agent has, as usual, decided what 1 utile means (an arbitrary choice). Then for r E JEt with r 2: 0, the agent imag ines event A with probability ,� 1 such that if A occurs the agent loses 1 utile, and if A occurs the agent gains some prize Q. r utiles is defined to be the value of a prize Q which is just sufficiently large to ensure that she expects not to lose in this situation (so that the expected utility is 0). Negative values of utility are cal ibrated with a similar thought experiment, but where the agent gains 1 utile if A occurs.
The Order of Magnitude Calculus
We will develop a calculus which can used for reasoning about the orders of magnitude of extended reals. This will be used to generate an order of magnitude theory of probability and utility.
1The reader may not find justifications of Bayesian probability particularly convincing, and may consider that much more general measures of belief are rational (e.g., [Walley, 91; Shafer, 81] ). I would agree, but we obviously cannot hope to give a stronger justification of Extended Probability than there is of Bayesian probability;
4.1
Orders of Magnitude and their Meanings
where Z is the set of integers. The element (0, oo) will sometimes be written as 0, element ( +, 0) as 1, and
r�r -0 ifr= O where sign(r) = + if r > 0 and sign(r) = -if r < 0. The element ( +, n) will be used for reasoning about elements r of JR• of positive sign and of order �n, i.e., r such that r0 = (+,n), for example �n and 3�n i��. Similarly ( -, n) represents r such that r0 = ( -, n), e.g., -2�n. Note that the operation r � r0 is not onto; the image is the set ( JR0 \ J R�) U { 0} where J R� = {(0, n) : n E Z U { oo} }. If r0 = (+, n) and s0 = (-,n) then (r +s)0 could be 0, (+,m) or (-, m) for any m 2: n. For example, if r =� n and s = -2�n then r0 = (+,n), S0 = (-, n) and (r+ s)0 = (-,n); if, however, s = -�n then (r +s) " = 0. This is the reason that we included elements (0, n) in JR0: to ensure that JR0 is closed under addition.
(O, n) is intended to represent elements r of JR• with f 2: n.
Thus elements of /R0 are interpreted as representing certain subsets of J R". For a E JR0 we define subset a• of J R" which will be viewed as the 'meaning' of a.
The calculus we will develop for JR0 may be viewed as a simple way of reasoning about these subsets.
For a E JR0 \ JR�, let a• = {r E J R• : r0 =a}. Thus, for n E Z, ( +, n )" is the set of positive elements of J R" of order n, {r : r > O,f = n}, and (-, n)" is the set of negative elements of JR" of order n, {r : r < o, r = n }.
4.2
The Operations on Ro
The operations on J R• induce operations on J Ro (the definitions are formally justified by Theorem 1 in sec tion 5.1). These are related to operations in Parsons' work on qualitative uncertainty e.g. [Parsons, 93] .
, where oo+ m = m+oo = oo for m E Z U { oo }, and ® is the natural multiplication of signs: it is the commutative operation on { +, -, 0} such that+®-=-,+®+= -®-= +, and for any o-E {+, -,0}, o-® 0 = 0. As usual, a X b will be sometimes abbreviated to ab. This multiplication is associative and commutative, and (JR0 \ J R�, x) is an abelian group. Also -1 X -1 = 1 and for any a E J Ro, a X 0 = 0 and a X 1 = a. For b E /R0 \ J Rg define b-1 to be the multiplica tive inverse of b, and for a
if m = n where +$+=+ , -$-= -, and otherwise, 0'$0'1 = 0.
Addition is associative and commutative, and a+O = a for any a E JR0• We have distributivity: for a, b, c E JR0, (a + b )c = ac + be. , 0) represents (e.g., -2 E JR•) is smaller than one of the elements that (-, 0) represents (e.g., -1 E JEt).
Interpretation of the Order of Magnitude Calculus
Here we give a precise semantics for the order of mag nitude calculus. The meaning of elements (and hence subsets) of JR• is given above. As stated there, each element a of l R0 will be viewed as a representation of the set a• � JR•. Thus order of magnitude statements are interpreted as statements about JR•. Extended real r E a• will be described as an interpretation of a. Each a E lR0 is considered to be representing some unknown interpretation r E JR•.
We will show that the calculus is sound and complete in a particular sense. Roughly speaking, soundness will mean that any computation in the order of mag nitude calculus is correct when viewed as a statement about subsets of JR•; completeness will mean that the (5T will sometimes be (implicitly) referred to as 5 x T, although this notation is used as little as possible to avoid confusion with product sets.) The following result justifies the operations in the order of magnitude calculus.
Theorem 1
For a,b,c E JR0 with c ¢ JR�,
In other words, the structures (lR0, +, X,> ) and ( { a• : a E l R0}, +, x, >) are isomorphic, with isomor phism a t-t a•.
The proof is tedious but straight-forward. One might imagine that all the important properties of the order of magnitude calculus can be derived from those of subsets of JR•. This is not the case; we are fortunate that the very valuable distributivity property holds in the order of magnitude calculus, and hence in the cal culus of the corresponding subsets of JR•, since it does not hold for arbitrary subsets of JR•; for example, if 5 = T = {1}, U = {1,2}, then (5 + T)U = {2}U = {2,4}, but 5U + TU = U + U = {2,3,4}.
Completeness Results for Arithmetic Statements
We will construct arithmetic formulae based on set of symbols X = {x 1 , x:h ... }. Define the set of arithmetic formulae .A to be the smallest set of strings of symbols such that (i) for all i = 1 , 2, ... , the symbol x; is in .A; x; is said to have symbol set { x;}; (ii) if <p, 1/1 E .A with symbol sets Y and Z respectively, and Y n Z = 0, then the following (strings of symbols) are in .A : (-<p) and (<p-1 ), which both have symbol set Y, ( <p + 1/1) and ( <p X 1/1) which both have symbol set Y U Z.
For example, (x2 + ( -(x 1 X x3))) is an arithmetic for mula with symbol set {x 1 ,x2, x3}. Note that each symbol x; can appear at most once in an arithmetic formula.
Consider some tuple R = (R, R', +, x, -(·), (-)-1 ), where R is a set, R' � R, + and x are binary op erations on R, -( · ) is a function from R to R, and (.)-1 is a function from R' to R.
An instantiation !! in R for arithmetic formula <p is a function from Y to R, where Z � Y � X and Z is the symbol set of <p. <p(!!) is then defined to be the value of the arithmetic expression <p when symbol x; is replaced by f!( x;) for each x; E Z. Formally it is defined inductively as follows:
, and ( <p-1 )(!!) equals the string 'undefined' otherwise.
The definition allows us to instantiate different sym bols x; and x J with the same value r E R. For ex ample, if <p = (x2 + ( -(x 1 X x3))), R = JRo, and (iii) can be viewed as a soundness and completeness result for the order of magnitude calculus; any strict inequality statement that can be deduced in the or der of magnitude calculus is true when viewed as a statement about the extended reals (soundness); con versely, any strict inequality statement in the order of magnitude calculus which is true when viewed as a statement in the extended reals, can be deduced in the order of magnitude calculus (completeness). To define order of magnitude probability and utility, we use, as before, the standard definitions, except us ing JR0 instead of JR.
An order of magnitude utility function on Q is a func tion from n to JR0• An order of magnitude probability function P over Q is defined to be an JR0 -valued probability function (with R' = JR0 \ JR�; see definition of R-valued probability function in section 2. 3).
6.1
The Meaning of Order of Magnitude Probability
If I is a function from some set W to JR0 then g: W -+ JR• is said to be an interpretation of I if for all wE W, g(w) E (/(w)r. If g happens also to be an extended probability function then we say that g is a probabilistic interpretation of I. Each order of magnitude probability function P over Q has a probabilistic interpretation; for example we can define extended probability function R by R( w) = 0 if P(w) = 0 and R(w) =a.!", for P(w) = (+,n), where a is a normalisation constant (and then we extend R by additivity to 2°). Conversely, each extended prob ability function R is a probabilistic interpretation for exactly one order of magnitude probability function R0 given by R"( A ) = (R(A)) " ; also for all A, B � Q with R0(B) � JR�, R0(AiB) = (R(AIB)) " . Similar comments apply for utility.
This means that an order of magnitude probability function P may be viewed as a representation of a set of extended probability functions, i. e., its probabilistic interpretations, which were given meaning in section 3
and in [Wilson, 95] .
Thus if P(A) = (+, 1) then we judge the probability of A to be of the same order as the calibrating event E (see section 3.3); if P(B) = ( +, n) we judge the probability of B be of the same order as n independent events, each of which has probability equal to that of E.
6.2
Kappa Functions
A kappa function over n is defined to be a function "':
(ii) for A,B � n such that An B = 0, K(A u B)= min (K(A), K(B)).
For kappa function "' over Q and A, B � Q such that
Kappa functions are a slight generalisation of Spohn's NCFs [Spohn, 88, 90] , in that a non-empty set A can be assigned value oo, meaning 'A is impossible'; they have been used, for example, in [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 91; Goldszmidt, 92; Pearl, 93a, b] . They are also closely related to Zadeh's possibility functions [Dubois and Prade, 88] ; the mapping"' f-+ 2-" gives an embedding of kappa functions into the set of possibility measures.
The values of an order of magnitude probability func
{0}. This set is totally ordered by >, and in fact ([ 0,1 ]", +,x,>) can be seen to be isomorphic to
min , +, <) . Using this isomorphism, it is
easy to see that order of magnitude probability func tions are just kappa functions, with their values la belled differently; also definitions of conditional val ues K(AIB) and P(AIB) can be seen to be equivalent. This means that the justification above for order of magnitude probabilities also justifies kappa functions. Of course, this justification is closely related to stan dard justifications in terms of infinitesimal probabili ties such as (Spohn, 90] , but I think that it is stronger since it is based on a more meaningful theory of in finitesimal probability (see section 3). The justifica tion also benefits logics such as Adams' [66, 75] which can be given semantics in terms of kappa functions (see e.g., [Goldszmidt, 92] ). This section shows how the definitions for order of magnitude probability and utility lead to an order of magnitude decision theory, and the relationship with the decision theory for kappa functions in [Pearl, 93a] is discussed.
7.1
Expectation Expectation for order of magnitude probability func tions can be defined in the usual way, and turns out to have the usual linearity properties.
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Proposition Let P be an order of magnitude probability function over n, and let U and V be order of magnitude utility functions on n. Define P(U), the expected value of U with respect to P, to be L wEO P(w)U (w) (note that the summation sign makes sense because of the com mutativity and associativity of addition in lR0). For ,\ E IE?", let U). be the constant function on Q which takes value ,\, Then, (i) P(U + V) = P(U) + P( V );
(ii) P( -U) = -P(U);
where, as usual, addition and scalar multiplication of the order of magnitude utility functions is defined pointwise.
This result follows easily from the properties of the order of magnitude calculus given in section 4.2.
Let P and U be an order of magnitude probability and utility function on Q, respectively. Let 0' = {wE Q : P(w) =j; 0}. For w E 0' let us write P(w) as (+, K(w)) and U(w) as (u (w), m(w)). Then, P(U) equals 2:P(w )U (w) = 2: (+, K(w)) (u (w), m(w)), wEO wEO'
which equals (+ , u+)+(O,u0)+( -,u-) = (u, u) where, for X E {+ , -, 0}, uX = min ., EO':cr(w)=x (K(w )+m(w)) (the operator min taken over the empty set is defined to have value oo), u = min (u+, u0, u-) , and
u= -if u-<u0,u+; 0 otherwise.
7.2
Comparison of Expected Utility
Suppose we are comparing two options with associated order of magnitude probability and utility functions P;, U; for i = 1, 2. Option 1 is strictly preferred to option 2 if P 1 (Ul) > P:�(U:�).
Theorem 3 For i. = 1, 2, let P; be order of magnitude probability functions over n and U; be order of magnitude utility functions on n. Then P1(Ul) > P2(U:�) if and only if for any probabilistic interpretations R; of P; (i. = 1, 2), and for any interpretations V; of U, (i = 1, 2),
This can be viewed as a soundness and completeness result for the order of magnitude decision theory: we strictly prefer option 1 to option 2 if and only if for all probabilistic interpretations we would do so.
7.3
Pearl's Decision Theory for Kappa Functions
In [Pearl, 93a, section 3] a decision theory for kappa functions is developed. 2 The scale used for utility is coarser than that given here, and leads sometimes to conclusions being unnecessarily weak.
Pearl's order of magnitude utility functions on n are functions J.' from n to Z, the set of integers. Let K be a kappa function over n. For i = 0, 1, 2, ... , the set W/ is defined to be {wE n : J.'( w) = i} and W; -is defined to be { w E n : J.'( w) = -i}. Define non negative integers n+ and n-by n+ = max;(O,i K(W/)) and n-= max; (O, i-K(wn).
The expected utility of J.' with respect to K is then defined in [Pearl, 93a] to be { ambiguous if n+ = n-> 0;
n + -notherwise.
As we shall shortly see, this cannot have been what Pearl intended; instead he probably intended the ex pected utility e of J.' with respect to K to be
Let n = {w l,w2}, and define K, by K( wl) = K( w2) = 0, corresponding to non-infinitesimal values of probabil ity, and J.' by J.'(wl) = 4, J.'( w2) = -3, which correspond to utilities of orders 1/ �4 and -1/ �3 respectively. Thus the expected utility will be of order 1/�4 -1/�3 which is of order 1/ �4. We haven+ = 4, n-= 3, so the orig inal definition of expected value of /A with respect to K gives a value of 1 corresponding to expected utility of order 1/�, not 1/�4. The second definition gives the correct answer in this example and will be justified using the order of mag nitude calculus.
As explained earlier, kappa function K corresponds to an order of magnitude probability function P, and, using the above correspondence, J.' functions can be viewed as order of magnitude utility functions U; for example �J( w) = -5 is translated to U(w) = ( -, -5) and �J( w) = 0 is translated to U( w) = ( 0 ,0). Thus we can use the results of 7.1 to give the correct expected value. Using the results and notation of section 7.1 we have P (U) = ( 0'1 u) where 0' equals { 0 if u = u0 0 if u =J u0 and u+ = u-;
+ �f u =J u0 and u+ < u-;
-1f u =J u0 and u+ > u-.
By considering some w1 E n with K(w') = 0, we can see that, because of the special form of U, (i) u ::; 0 and (ii) u = u0 <=::: :> u = 0 <=::: :> u+, u-;::: : 0. These facts enable us to eliminate mentions of u0 and u in the above equation. Proving that n+ = max(O, -u +) and n-= max( O, -u -) is straight-forward, and these equivalences can be used to show that P(U) equals ifn+=n-=0 if n+ = n-> 0; ifn+>n-· if n+ < n-:
When we convert the order of magnitude values into Pearl's !A-values we get the amended definition.
This justifies Pearl's (amended) decision theory. Note, that we have just shown a soundness result; it does sometimes give unnecessarily weak results, as shown by the following example, in which we have a choice between two options with associated K and /A func tions. Let n = {w l,w2}· Fori= 1,2, let K,( wd = K;(w2) = 0. Let J.' 1 ( w l) = 2 and /A2( w2) = -2 , and let J.'2( wl) = -5 = 1J2(w2). The expected value e 1 of J.'l with respect to K1 equals 'ambiguous', and e 2 = -5 so neither option is preferred over the other. How ever, the expected utility in the first option is of or der ±1/ �2 which is greater than the expected util ity of the second option, of order -1/ �5. The or der of magnitude calculus is able to give this con clusion (as we know from the completeness results):
P 1 (Ul) = ( 0 ,-2) > (-, -5) = P2(U2).
Thus, although we have given Pearl's order of magni tude decision theory a formal semantics, it has an um ber of disadvantages compared to one developed in this paper; it cannot represent infinitesimal utilities, it does not distinguish utilities of order 1, represent ing finite positive benefit, from utilities of order -1, representing finite negative benefit; also, it does not distinguish different grades of ambiguity, which means that it lacks the completeness results enjoyed by this paper's formalism.
Discussion
This is clearly a rather simple order of magnitude cal culus; it was designed to be just expressive enough to give a satisfactory decision theory for kappa func tions. There are natural ways to extend the calculus;
we might add elements (p, n) representing the non negative elements of order at most n, and ( m, n) rep resenting the non-positive elements of order at most n, so that e.g., (p, n ) " = {r E JR• : r :2: n, r :2: 0}. We might also then consider adding a squaring operation. The semantics of this would be given by defining for
